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NEPAL: BACK TO THE GUN 
I. OVERVIEW 
With the collapse of the ceasefire and peace talks 
between government and Maoist insurgents, Nepal 
appears to be in for months more of bloody fighting. 
There are prospects for eventual resumption of 
negotiations since neither side can realistically expect 
a military victory, and there are indications of what a 
diplomatic compromise might look like. However, 
the international community needs to urge all sides 
toward compromise and press the government to 
restore democracy, bring the political parties back 
into the picture and control the army’s tendency to 
commit serious abuses when conducting operations. 
Similarly, the Maoists should discontinue targeted 
assassinations, bombing and widespread extortion. 
The country quickly plunged back into the violence 
that has killed more than 7,000 people since February 
1996. Sharp splits between government negotiators 
and the Maoists, particularly over a possible 
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, led 
the Maoists to withdraw officially from the ceasefire 
on 27 August 2003. They marked the end of the 
ceasefire by shooting two Royal Nepalese Army 
(RNA) colonels, one fatally, in Kathmandu the next 
day, and violence quickly erupted across the country. 
In the weeks following the break down of the 
ceasefire, more than 500 people have died. 
Yet, in many ways, the official end of the ceasefire 
was almost a formality. Both government and 
Maoist forces were in regular violation of the code 
of conduct that was supposed to govern their 
activities during the halt in fighting, and both sides 
suspected the other of planning an imminent attack. 
The Maoists continued to recruit heavily and 
practice widespread extortion, and fired on a 
motorcade of former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba on 26 August 2003. Government forces 
continued to make their presence felt throughout the 
countryside, and in what would appear to be a gross 
violation of international law, summarily executed at 
least nineteen individuals they suspected of being 
Maoists on 17 August 2003 in the eastern village of 
Doramba, Ramechhap district.1 
As the conflict has resumed, the Maoists appear to 
be embracing an evolving strategy. Largely moving 
away from mass attacks on district police and army 
headquarters, the group has focused on attacks by 
smaller cells. This has included more widespread 
urban assassinations of army, police and party 
officials in an effort to tie security forces down in 
the cities. The Maoists have also expanded their 
activities in eastern Nepal and the Terai (the 
flatlands that border India), areas that had felt the 
crisis less acutely during earlier periods of fighting. 
The RNA, having significantly upgraded its 
firepower and improved base defences during the 
ceasefire, has claimed a number of successful 
offensives. Substantiating the battlefield claims of 
both sides remains difficult. 
With both the Maoists and the RNA determined to 
use battlefield gains to secure leverage for future 
talks, the danger of a widening conflict are 
substantial. Further, and despite mounting 
international pressure for the palace and the 
political parties to work together, King Gyanendra 
still appears reluctant to install a genuine all-party 
government or fully restore the democratic process. 
Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa has expressed 
willingness to form such a government, but only 
under his leadership – a provision that will likely 
remain a deal-breaker with the main parties.  
The return to violence is all the more unfortunate 
because it is not difficult to imagine a series of 
agreements around which the king, RNA, political 
parties and Maoists could coalesce. A number of 
useful proposals have been put on the table, 
 
 
1 See the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal, 
“Doramba Incident, Ramachap”, On the spot Inspection and 
Report of the Investigation Commission, September 2003. 
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although far more remains to be done to flesh out 
the implementation of a reasonable peace deal, and 
dramatic improvements could be made in the 
negotiating process itself. It also remains clear that 
the sooner a genuine multi-party government is 
established and democracy restored, the higher the 
chance for a durable solution to the conflict. 
II. WHY THE CEASEFIRE BROKE  
In many ways, Nepal’s seven-month ceasefire ended 
the way it began. Just three days before the ceasefire 
was announced on 29 January 2003, the Maoists 
assassinated the Chief of the Armed Police Force, 
Krishna Mohan Shestha. Just one day after the 
ceasefire broke down on 27 August 2003 following 
three rounds of peace talks, the Maoists targeted two 
RNA colonels in Kathmandu, killing Colonel Kiran 
Basnet in his home and wounding Colonel Ramindra 
KC. Colonel Basnet is the highest ranking military 
official killed to date. Violence has also flared across 
much of Nepal, including many areas that had 
largely been spared attacks during earlier fighting.  
The breakdown in talks comes almost a year after 
King Gyanendra essentially suspended Nepal’s 
democratic system.2 Public concerns about the 
suspension of democracy were muted amid high 
hopes that the palace could deliver a peace deal with 
the Maoists. Yet, after more than a year of royalist 
rule, largely fruitless talks, the continuing isolation 
of political parties and a renewed spate of killings by 
both sides, hard questions are being asked about the 
course on which Nepal now finds itself.  
The proximate cause of the breakdown in the 
ceasefire was the Maoists’ unwillingness to discuss 
issues other than the constituent assembly in the 
third round of peace talks. (In theory, a constituent 
assembly would gather elected representatives from 
across Nepal to draft a new constitution.) By most 
considerations, however, the return to war must be 
seen as the culmination of a steady erosion in 
confidence between the Maoists, the royalist 
government and the largely marginalised political 
parties. As one Nepalese political scientist 
bemoaned, “It was obvious that talks would break 




2 See ICG Asia Report N°50, Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire 
or Strategic Pause?, 10 April 2003, for a fuller discussion of 
the constitutionality of the king’s dismissal of Prime Minister 
Deuba on 4 October 2002.  
clearly preparing for war even as they were 
speaking of peace.3 
For a number of reasons, the Maoists had come to 
view the constituent assembly as a make or break 
issue. Several factors drove this perspective. First 
and foremost, they had come to doubt the sincerity 
of government negotiators and were concerned by 
what appeared to be a deliberate go-slow approach. 
The government’s pace did leave much to be desired 
– it took seven months of negotiations before the 
government put its first substantive proposals on the 
table.  
From the onset of negotiations, the government 
appeared to envision that talks would stretch well 
over a year, allowing it to focus on working with 
displaced people and restoring local infrastructure. It 
also hoped to reintegrate Maoist cadres into village 
life through food-for-work programs. This approach 
was explicitly endorsed by the donor community. It 
also seems that the government reasoned that 
protracted talks would buy sufficient time to bolster 
the RNA and effectively limit the Maoists’ military 
option.  
While this approach may have been quite rational at 
one level, it had major flaws. First, instead of 
bringing the mainstream parties along, the palace 
deliberately sought to marginalise them. As one 
journalist commented, “The king has made up his 
mind. He will solve the Maoist problem first and 
then deal with the parties”.4 The code of conduct did 
not mention the parties at all, and over time, they 
began to view street protests as their only outlet to 
protect their interests.  
Further, the government appeared to miscalculate 
badly the strains that protracted talks would place 
upon the Maoists. The insurgents’ ability to engage 
in rather leisurely discussions with the monarchy 
they had long hoped to abolish was limited. As one 
Western diplomatic official noted of the Maoists, 
“They had to keep dal bhat in the stomachs of their 
cadres”.5 Local commanders were unhappy with the 
peace process, and given the difficulty of sustaining 
an active guerrilla force in the field, the Maoists 
viewed a go-slow approach as a deliberate attempt to 
sap their military strength. Not surprisingly, after 
 
3 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 22 September 2003. 
4 ICG interview, Patan, 19 September 2003. 
5 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 19 September. Dal Bhat is the 
Nepalese national dish, consisting of rice and lentils.  
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seven months of talks, the Maoists were eager to 
push explicitly political issues such as the 
constituent assembly up on the agenda. “They know 
an elongated peace process is a trap”, one diplomat 
commented.6 
The government’s decision to backtrack from its 
agreement during the second round of talks on 9 
May 2003 to limit the RNA to a five-kilometre range 
from its bases during the ceasefire also soured the 
environment. (The decision to jettison the five-
kilometre limit appears to have been largely driven 
by the RNA, which was not consulted when the 
proposal was offered and had legitimate security 
concerns about essentially giving the Maoists free 
rein in the countryside.) In retrospect, this also 
would appear to mark the point from which the RNA 
has taken a much more active role both in talks and 
public life generally. A journalist argued that the 
RNA is now more influential than ever, and “has 
become a powerful political force”.7 Some maintain 
that it now has a de facto veto over any prime 
minister the king might choose, leading one local 
political scientist to comment, “The military has 
tasted power, and it is very dangerous for a country 
like this”.8 
The replacement of its entire negotiating team when 
Prime Minister Lokendra Chand stepped down on 
30 May 2003 and was followed by Surya Bahadur 
Thapa further added to the perception that the 
government was dithering. The king’s unwillingness 
to appoint an all-party government after Chand’s 
resignation – even after the main political parties 
jointly proposed the Unified-Marxist Leninist 
(UML) general  secretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, to 
head it – sharpened doubts among both the Maoists 
and the political parties that the king was sincere 
about power sharing. 
The lack of progress in the talks fuelled increasing 
restiveness among Maoist hardliners and many rural 
cadres. While decision-making within the politburo 
remains opaque, differences, but not splits, appeared 
to open up among the leadership as the third round 
of talks loomed.9 According to some accounts, the 
chief Maoist negotiator, Dr Baburam Bhattarai, and 
 
 
6 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 18 September 2003. 
7 ICG interview 19 September 2003. 
8 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 22 September 2003. 
9 This analysis is based upon ICG interviews with a range of 
commentators and officials, including individuals familiar 
with the thinking of senior Maoist leaders. 
a number of rural commanders pushed to end the 
talks, while part of the politburo, including Pushpa 
Kamal Dahal (nom de guerre Prachanda) and the 
military chief, Ram Bahadur Thapa, felt they were 
making inroads in expanding their political base 
around the country and favoured remaining at the 
table. The alleged compromise was to make the 
take-it or leave-it proposal for a constituent 
assembly. That assembly has always been a bedrock 
Maoist demand so it is no surprise that the politburo 
and rural cadres could rally around such a position. 
When the government presented a position paper at 
the third round that offered substantial reforms that 
could be constitutional amendments but not a 
constituent assembly, things quickly fell apart. 
Maoist leader Prachanda claimed that those “not only 
failed to address the basic problems facing the 
country, it proved their conspiracy to strengthen the 
feudal retrogression of 4 October with reformist 
sugar coating”.10 The government position paper may 
well have been a good jumping off point for dialogue 
in February or March 2003, but by August the 
Maoists saw it as further proof of government 
stonewalling. While they left the door open to future 
talks, as did the government, what had been a 
promising window for peace quickly slammed shut.11  
A. EROSION OF CONFIDENCE 
In many ways, the slide toward conflict followed an 
all-too-predictable path. The RNA and the Maoists 
were never able to develop effective mechanisms for 
monitoring and verifying the “code of conduct” they 
had agreed would govern their behaviour during the 
 
10 Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), “Statement by 
Comrade Prachanda”, Revolutionary Worker #1212, 14 
September 2003.  
11 Why the Maoists have remained so insistent on a 
constituent assembly instead of accepting the concept of 
amending the constitution or negotiating specific reforms 
with the government and other political parties is a 
legitimate question with no definitive answer. In addition 
to the tactical elements described above, they take the 
position that the 1990 constitution is defunct and therefore 
not a proper subject of mere amendment. They presumably 
also believe they can achieve more sweeping changes to 
their liking in an assembly that would presumably have 
representatives of more social groupings and be less tightly 
structured than a diplomatic conference. For a more 
detailed considerations of these matters, see ICG Asia 
Report N°57, Nepal: Obstacles to Peace, 17 June 2003, in 
particular section II, “Constitutional Considerations”, pp. 11 
and following. 
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ceasefire.12 The lack of an influential guarantor to 
help referee the code was one reason the crisis in 
confidence grew so severe. A facilitator at the talks 
observed, “From the very beginning, the Maoists 
were complaining about the government, and the 
government was complaining about the Maoists”.13 
Mutual suspicion was pervasive.  
The RNA felt the Maoists were using the ceasefire to 
smuggle arms, expand recruiting, intensify extortion 
and plan new attacks. There continue to be credible 
reports that the Maoists employ child soldiers and 
forcibly recruit. Maoist support for pan-revolutionary 
causes such as the Revolutionary International 
Movement (RIM), a loose coalition of communist 
guerrilla groups and insurgencies across South Asia 
and beyond, have made some observers question the 
genuineness of their commitment to both peace and 
democracy. The failure of the Maoists to articulate 
their vision for how a constituent assembly would be 
conducted – what some have called an “agree and we 
will tell you” approach – also raised questions about 
their ultimate intentions. One journalist maintained 
that the Maoist leadership remained essentially 
beholden to its cadres, “and didn’t have the courage 
to tell the cadres that the war can’t be won”.14 
The Maoists had equally serious concerns about 
their opponents. The RNA and police resisted being 
restricted to their barracks, and the second team of 
negotiators, headed by Communications Minister 
Thapa, took a harder line than its predecessor, led by 
Physical Planning Minister Colonel Narayan Singh 
Pun. As one diplomatic observer commented, the 
new negotiators saw the confidence building 
measures established under Prime Minister Chand as 
“one-sided concessions where the Maoists got away 
with murder”.15 The RNA and the palace appeared to 
believe that the Maoists would simply lay down their 
guns as a deal got closer and did not work to 
establish a credible demobilisation process linked to 
substantive talks. The Maoists were also deeply 
concerned by a steady flow of foreign military 
assistance to the government, their appearance on 
the U.S. State Department Terrorist Watch List,16 the 
 
 
12 For the full text of the code, see ICG Asia Report N°57, 
Nepal: Obstacles to Peace, 17 June 2003. 
13 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 21 September 2003. 
14 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 21 September 2003. 
15 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 17 September 2003. 
16 U.S. State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, at 
http://state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/ 2002. 
king’s unwillingness to meet directly, and growing 
unrest among their cadres. 
Both sides sought to maximise their gains during the 
ceasefire. The Maoists expanded their financial base 
and got more and more people to talk seriously 
about potentially embracing a constituent assembly. 
In a major concession, the government freed more 
than 100 Maoists from prison – cadres who are again 
fighting government forces. The Maoists also 
expanded recruitment in eastern Nepal and the Terai, 
and worked to harness the energy of disaffected 
groups in these areas. A civil society activist noted, 
“The Maoists were successful in their mission, they 
got senior leaders out of prison, collected more 
money, had court cases dropped and reorganised”.17 
The RNA also used the ceasefire productively. It 
significantly improved the defences of its bases, 
making the high-profile attacks that marked the 
previous phase of the war far more difficult. With 
much improved fire power, some air capabilities and 
a new focus on field intelligence capabilities, it is in a 
far better position to engage in direct confrontations.  
A diplomat commented, “On the ground, the 
ceasefire was essentially over. The RNA was stung 
by the five-kilometre imbroglio, and was much more 
aggressive in asserting where it could go”.18 This 
included setting up army health camps for the 
public, a step the Maoists viewed as a provocation 
and that led to a series of clashes. One journalist 
argued that it had become clear “the army detests the 
ceasefire”.19 Code of conduct violations by one side 
or the other became almost daily occurrences, and 
mutual suspicions reached a fever pitch. Both the 
RNA and the Maoists appeared sincerely to believe 
that the other was preparing for attack. 
B. DORAMBA AND DEUBA 
The lack of confidence among the Maoists 
manifested itself in calls to have provisional 
agreements reached in the second round of talks 
implemented before initiating a third round. In late 
July 2003, the Maoists closed a liaison office in 
Kathmandu, and leaders quite publicly returned to 
the underground.  
 
17 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 18 September 2003. 
18 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 18 September 2003. 
19 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 21 September 2003. 
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The government’s lack of confidence manifested 
itself in unwillingness to present a substantive 
position, increasingly hard-line language, and a 
very messy political situation in Kathmandu. As the 
peace process started to fray, and the political 
parties became more active in their agitation, the 
royalist government increasingly fell back on ad 
hoc solutions. One Western diplomat commented 
that while the Maoists “seemed sincere earlier”, 
hopes for progress dissipated amid “the mess of the 
second round of talks and change of government”.20 
However, others questioned whether the Maoists 
were ever serious about the talks. 
The most disturbing security incident came on 17 
August 2003 as the third round of talks began in 
Nepalganj. It should stand as a stark warning to 
both the international community and the Nepalese 
on the dangers of protracted conflict. By most 
accounts, a raid in Doramba conducted by over 60 
RNA troops captured twenty individuals in a house, 
of whom eighteen were affiliated with the Maoists, 
and two lived there.21 Whether these were actually 
Maoist fighters remains in dispute – there are 
credible suggestions that the group was gathered 
for a wedding. The RNA unit led the detainees out 
of the village and marched them for several hours. 
Nineteen were then shot and their bodies – most 
with hands still bound – were pushed off the side of 
the steep trail, in what one who investigated the 
scene said could only be described as “summary 
executions”.22 One woman remains missing.  
It will be difficult to ascertain definitively whether 
this was the action of a rogue commander or was 
sanctioned by the RNA command. But it strains 
credibility that on the very day peace talks 
reconvened, a local commander in charge of a 
sizable operation would take extreme measures that 
obviously could effectively end the ceasefire 
without any authority.  
It is also troubling that the incident has not generated 
a greater public outcry. While the Human Rights 
Commission released fairly tough findings, donors, 
NGOs and the press seemed almost to downplay the 
 
20 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 17 September 2003. 
21 See the National Human Rights Commission of Nepal, 
“Doramba Incident, Ramachap”, op. cit. 
22 A senior member of the diplomatic community and a 
National Human Rights Commission investigation team 
member used this identical language in describing the incident 
to ICG during September 2003 interviews. 
matter. Doramba also calls into question the efficacy 
of international military assistance to and training of 
the RNA. Donors have always insisted that training, 
including human rights training, was a vital part of 
military aid. The argument was that by engaging 
with the RNA, the international community would 
have a better chance of modifying its behaviour. If 
the military does not fully account for its actions at 
Doramba and prosecute any individuals who 
committed crimes, the international community 
should conclude that it is inappropriate to provide 
current levels of military assistance to an undemocratic 
government in an increasingly dirty war. 
Doramba left the Maoists deeply angry, and the third 
round of talks was largely stillborn. On 26 August 
2003, the Maoists fired upon the motorcade of 
former Prime Minister Deuba in Kailali. Deuba was 
unhurt. The attack made little sense – his party has 
been one of the few to support a constituent 
assembly – and called into question Maoist control 
of some local commanders.  
The next day the Maoists announced their unilateral 
withdrawal from the ceasefire.  
C. A NOTE ON PROCESS 
The three rounds of talks during 2003, much like the 
talks conducted under Deuba between August and 
November 2001, were poorly run from a technical 
standpoint. The process was often chaotic; mediators 
and negotiators appeared to lack training; there was 
no real secretariat; and international technical support 
for it as well as monitoring of the ceasefire was 
extremely limited. In a number of instances, the 
government team appeared to work at cross purposes, 
and competing press conferences seemed to get as 
much weight as the substance of negotiations. 
However, the Thapa team of government negotiators 
gets higher marks for professionalism than its 
predecessor, and the atmosphere at the talks was said 
generally to be quite cordial. 
Having facilitators who are almost directly aligned 
with the sides (two facilitators were viewed as tilting 
Maoist, two as being loyal royalists) may not be the 
best idea. The government informed the facilitators 
by letter after the collapse that any future talks will 
be “arranged in a new manner” with some overhaul 
of the facilitation team. 
A number of individuals close to the talks observed 
that the Maoists were concerned that government 
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negotiators were a somewhat selective conduit of 
information to and from the palace, in a situation 
where “the king was just behind the screen”.23 In a 
secret meeting between Maoist officials and the 
government before the third round, Baburam 
Bhattarai allegedly sought clarification on the king’s 
role and was assured that he was fully in charge and 
willing to embrace progressive changes.  
The confusion over decision-making authority 
prompted repeated calls by the Maoists for the RNA 
and the king to declare that any agreement reached 
at the negotiating table would be binding. This 
underscores the need for government negotiators to 
have plenipotentiary powers so that decisions made 
at the table actually represent a deal. There may also 
be reason for King Gyanendra himself to engage in 
negotiations directly with the Maoists and the 
political parties. He has said that a direct meeting 
with the Maoists is “not impossible”, although he 
also downplayed his own significant hand in 
government saying, “A government with executive 
powers is involved in negotiations, and it will 
decide. A constitutional monarch need not meet 
them and make decisions”.24  
The Maoists might also wish to take a hard look at 
their own diplomatic representation. A source close 
to the talks noted of Dr. Bhattarai, “He doesn’t have 
a great understanding of compromise”.25 A journalist 
echoed this and maintained, “For Baburam Bhattarai, 
compromise is a sign of weakness”.26 
In many respects, the government failed to take 
advantage of seven months of ceasefire other than to 
bolster its military capabilities. Beyond controversial 
army health camps, it delivered little assistance to 
conflict affected areas. This highlights the difficulties 
of keeping the governance of Nepal frozen as the 
royalist government and democratic political parties 
steadily work to undercut each other.  
India continues to resist all but the mildest forms of 
international engagement with the conflict. And, as 
one international official said of its influence on 
outside mediation or negotiation, “If they don’t want 
it to happen, it won’t”. However, there may be some 
willingness from Delhi to concur in international 
 
23 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 21 September 2003. 
24 Nepal Magazine, 18 August-1 September 2003. 
25 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 17 September 2003. 
26 ICG interview, Patan, 19 September 2003. 
help for establishing a secretariat or the provision of 
specific and low-key expertise during future talks.27 
III. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF THE 
CONFLICT  
As fighting has resumed, it has become clear that 
its nature has significantly changed. The Maoists 
are attacking on more fronts, in a more diffuse 
fashion, and looking to keep the RNA and police 
off-balance and on the defensive. The RNA hopes 
to use improved training, an upgraded arsenal and a 
revamped approach to intelligence to inflict heavy 
casualties. That more than 500 have died since the 
ceasefire ended, including a relative lull during the 
Dashain holiday, would seem to indicate that the 
lethality of the conflict escalates the longer it lasts. 
A Nepalese NGO official noted, “The Maoists 
changed their whole strategy of war; they can’t attack 
district headquarters anymore”.28 This observer 
argued that the Maoist leadership, although receiving 
extensive press coverage from them, viewed attacks 
on army and police headquarters as of limited utility 
and increasingly costly in casualties.  
The Maoists have chosen targets more selectively, 
while largely avoiding large mobilisations. In an 
effort to limit their own casualties, they have moved 
to more hit and run attacks organised by small cells 
of two or three. On 7 September 2003, six separate 
bomb blasts hit Kathmandu, wounding about a 
dozen people and killing a twelve-year old boy.29 
Some appeared to be relatively sophisticated, and 
RNA officials indicated that the Maoists are using 
more remote control devices triggered by cell 
phones and pagers. The bombs came on the heels of 
the aforementioned shooting of two RNA colonels in 
Kathmandu.  
In addition, the Maoists conducted a three-day 
general strike (bandh), 18-20 September, which was 
widely observed and largely peaceful. The Maoists 
have also launched a wave of bank robberies and 
destroyed the houses of a number of government and 
political officials. On 22 September they shot a sub-
 
 
27 This indication comes from multiple discussions with 
members of the Indian diplomatic community in Nepal and 
elsewhere, as well as well as from other international 
representatives in Kathmandu. 
28 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 17 September 2003. 
29 Kathmandu Post, 8 September 2003. 
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inspector of police in Kathmandu. An international 
security expert noted, “The Maoists are able to 
attack where and when they want”.30 The RNA is 
still fairly slow to respond. Often the perpetrators are 
long gone by the time the army or police arrive. 
Maoist officials insist that unless the government 
offers peaceful and forward-looking solutions to 
the conflict, they will begin what Baburam 
Bhattarai calls “the preparatory stage of transition 
from strategic equilibrium to strategic offensive”.31 
Bhattarai contended that: 
Some isolated incidents of unintended death 
of civilians in legitimate sabotage actions or 
capital punishment to certain individuals in 
recent weeks have been highly exaggerated 
by the genocidal monarchical state and a 
section of the media, but this does not reflect 
any fundamental change in the military 
strategy of the party.32 
The Maoists have also sharply increased attacks in 
the Terai and eastern Nepal, having successfully 
expanded recruitment in these areas during the 
ceasefire. There appears to have been a particular 
effort to reach out to the Mahedesi in the Terai, a 
group that has long operated on the margins of 
society and suffers widespread discrimination. 
Increased activity in these areas also opens up new 
sources of extortion for the Maoists. Their efforts to 
secure financial support in parts of the desperately 
poor western and mid-western regions – where 
many banks have been repeatedly robbed – must 
encounter something of a law of diminishing 
returns.  
The Maoists still do not appear to believe that an 
all-out military victory is possible, particularly with 
international actors such as India, the U.S., China 
and the UK willing to prevent such an outcome. 
Instead, a medium intensity conflict would seem to 
fulfil a number of their needs: it convinces the 
cadres that their leadership has not “gone soft”, and 
it keeps pressure on the military and the political 
establishment to accede to their demands without 
burning all bridges. 
However, the strategy of urban assassination carries 
significant risks, since many in the international arena 
 
 30 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 19 September 2003. 
31 Correspondence with ICG, 26 September 2003. 
32 Ibid. 
are more likely to view such actions as terrorism, even 
if they are directed against military targets. Maoists 
continue to feel that violence has helped them 
achieve greater international recognition and a more 
say in discussions of Nepal’s future. However, they 
may have dangerously misread the relative impunity 
they enjoyed after the January 2003 assassination of 
the chief of the armed police. There will likely be a 
point of no return for the Maoists if they are widely 
perceived internationally as a terrorist organisation.  
The Maoists are clearly aiming for a magnified 
psychological impact in Kathmandu, and in some 
regards this is working. The assassinations have sent 
a chill of concern into the capital’s elite: generals are 
increasingly sleeping on their bases, and politicians 
have taken measures to improve their security. The 
Maoists may reason that by amplifying pressure in 
Kathmandu, the public and elites will be more eager 
to accept a constituent assembly. There is a palpable 
sense of tension among many Nepalese whose lives 
had largely been untouched by the earlier fighting. 
An NGO official argued that the new strategy is 
“clearly alienating the middle class in the cities”, but 
that this is not a group the Maoists have considered 
crucial to their agenda.33  
There seem to be two views of the targeted killings 
in urban areas: it could make the political and 
economic elites more eager to compromise and give 
in on the constituent assembly (a position to which 
they were drifting even before the ceasefire broke 
down); or it could cause them to dig in their heels 
and support a more sweeping military approach 
against Maoist forces. 
Already in control of significant parts of the 
countryside, the Maoists hope to keep the military 
tied down in the cities and limit its mobility. They 
may also be seeking to dominate a number of more 
rural districts in order to develop a rump government 
more fully. According to knowledgeable security 
officials, some 400 police have already been 
withdrawn into the Kathmandu valley, where more 
than 50 per cent of the security services are now 
stationed. This leaves the army spread quite thin for 
waging a traditional counter insurgency campaign. 
The emerging Maoist strategy also has given local 
commanders greater authority to decide who should 
be targeted for violence and extortion. This is a 
worrying trend, in that less central discipline over 
 
33 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 22 September 2003. 
Nepal: Back to the Gun 




such decisions often leads to greater violence driven 
by local vendettas. Indeed, there are already 
increasing reports of greater violence used not for 
political reasons, but simply because individuals 
refused to comply with extortion requests. This may 
well be a problem of a guerrilla organisation growing 
in size, where “more killings [are] not based on 
politics but just because of donations”, as one NGO 
official explained.34 There are also more reports of 
NGOs being harassed in the field, even those which 
have had an established relationship with the Maoists. 
The RNA may be falsely reading the shifting nature 
of the conflict as a victory. Lt. Colonel Kaji Bahadur 
Khattri argued in a late September press conference 
that the Maoists’ shifting strategy reflected weakness 
and disorganisation and that RNA firepower far 
outmatched that of the poorly armed insurgents. He 
said, “they have not been able to give a good fight to 
the army”.35 Yet, the pace of casualties has been as 
high as at any period of the war. The RNA has 
greatly upgraded the defensive perimeter of its bases 
with mines and other measures,36 and the Maoists’ 
may no longer feel comfortable fighting toe-to-toe. 
But there is no reason they have to. An international 
expert observed, “The RNA is prepared for what 
they did, not what they are doing”.  
The government and Maoists have engaged in claims 
and counterclaims with regard to casualties. For 
example, RNA officials claimed to have killed 45 
Maoists during a single encounter in Rolpa while 
losing six of their own men and one policeman. In 
contrast, the Maoists claimed they had only lost 
seven while killing twenty RNA and police.37 
Similarly, a Maoist press release claimed that cadres 
had killed as many as 41 RNA on 15 September in an 
ambush in the far western district of Kailali while 
suffering far fewer casualties. This was disputed by 
the RNA. It is very hard to tell exactly who is getting 
killed at this point. 
Anti-Maoist sentiment and institutional pride within 
the RNA have grown more intense with the 
assassination attempts in Kathmandu. This is the 
first war the RNA has ever really fought, and there 
are many in its senior ranks who want to ensure that 
it can only be regarded as a victory. A journalist 
 
34 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 22 September 2003. 
35 See The Kathmandu Post, Kantipur and Himalayan Times, 
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36 ICG interview, Patan, 19 September 2003. 
37 The Himalayan Times 19 September 2003. 
argued that “The RNA has been humiliated and 
wants to wash itself clean” after incidents such as 
Dang where it suffered heavy losses earlier in the 
war.38 By almost all accounts, the RNA is stronger 
and ready to escalate violence.  
Some within the RNA appear to feel that a military 
solution is now possible with its new equipment and 
training, although incidents such as Doramba raise 
doubts about how an intensified campaign would be 
conducted. Diplomats have made clear to the 
government that military excesses could endanger 
support, and there are some reports that the RNA is 
doing slightly better at limiting what were 
extraordinarily high civilian casualties. However, many 
Nepalese remain deeply concerned by what they see 
as general unprofessionalism in RNA operations.  
There continues to be a curfew on most of the 
country beyond Kathmandu’s ring road, and the 
government has again declared the Maoists a terrorist 
organisation. While a state of emergency has not 
been declared, the government and the RNA have 
few checks on their power. Whether the Maoists can 
mount spectacular attacks in Kathmandu remains to 
be seen, but the capital is not known for airtight 
security. The conflict continues to place a serious 
burden on Nepal’s economy, with tourism revenues 
again sinking. Growing numbers, having fled their 
villages, are now concentrated in Kathmandu. While 
the violence may have resumed with both sides 
hoping merely to give the other a bloody nose before 
returning to talks, its level may make the situation 
hard to bring under control. As one source close to 
the talks complained, “In the name of pressure, both 
sides will let thousands more die”.39 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE PARTIES  
That the royalist government continues to hold 
democracy and mainstream political parties at arm’s 
length has only made achieving peace more difficult. 
Even though the war has resumed, the capital 
remains consumed with political manoeuvring amid 
an environment of deep distrust. Political parties, 
shut out of power for more than a year, continue to 
reason that keeping pressure on the government is 
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their only viable option. While the palace continues 
to say the right things about democracy, including 
recent suggestions that it would like to see the 
democratic process restored at the local level, its 
actions have often lagged behind its rhetoric as 
concerns mount that the king is interested in 
maintaining a quasi-authoritarian role. 
The end of the ceasefire did bring important 
developments to the ongoing protests by the political 
parties designed to force the king to restore 
parliament or name an all-party government. The 
parties had hoped that a large rally long scheduled for 
4 September 2003 would provide a decisive push 
against the sitting royalist government. Major players 
in the diplomatic community, including India, the 
UK, U.S., China and Pakistan, were alarmed that 
demonstrations so soon after the breakdown of the 
ceasefire could quickly spin out of control. Both 
embassies and the palace appeared quite concerned 
that a mass rally could further destabilise the 
situation and open the door to potential Maoist 
manipulation of street protests. Fears that a tense 
situation in the streets could trigger widespread 
violence or a major government crackdown appeared 
to be justified. 
This is one of the first times that the above named 
countries have taken a common position. All called 
for the “constitutional forces” (the palace and the 
political parties) to work together and take a joint 
position to help restore peace and democracy. They 
also stressed that they would like to see the king 
institute an all-party government as an important 
step in moving the process forward, although it 
remains unclear how much genuine pressure has 
been applied. As a result of international pressure 
and threats of a government crackdown, the parties 
substantially scaled back the 4 September events, 
and what once was billed as a “decisive battle 
against” political regression, quickly became a far 
smaller face-saving protest.  
This unprecedented display of international cohesion 
sparked much local press rhetoric about foreign 
meddling. However, given the substantial aid 
provided by donors, it is not unreasonable that 
diplomats would try to make their voices heard. One 
analyst argued that the front is “an alliance of 
convenience and self-interest; all have specific 
reasons why further upheaval in Nepal is not in their 
long term interests. They want neither to get sucked 
in nor to see Nepal go under”.40 Such heightened 
engagement in the domestic situation makes it all the 
more imperative that the international community 
get its policy right. 
Mainstream political parties continue to express 
concerns that some members of the international 
community simply want them to play along as the 
palace sets the agenda and question whether genuine 
pressure is being put on the monarch to restore 
democracy. A measure of scepticism is 
understandable. For a year, the king has been 
reluctant either to appoint an all-party government or 
restore the suspended parliament. He continues to sit 
at the apex of a government that is unconstitutional 
by all reasonable standards, and he frequently seems 
to take a “divide and conquer” approach to dealing 
with the parties.  
When the ceasefire broke down, the king and the 
international community were displayed new 
eagerness to present the sitting government as a 
“constitutional force”, but it is not difficult to see 
why party leaders have little trust in the monarchy. 
“The king had the benefit of the doubt after 
[dismissing Prime Minister] Deuba, mainly because 
the situation was so bad”, argued a journalist, “but 
now with the ceasefire off and the country back in a 
spiral of violence, he has to do something to get back 
his legitimacy”.41 
Until the king either establishes an all-party 
government or restores parliament, it will remain 
quite difficult to accept the royalist government as 
constitutional. The king and the prime minister, in 
messages over the Dashain holiday, spoke of 
restoring democracy, with a particular emphasis on 
local elections. However, yet again, the impression 
left was distinctly that democracy is a matter for the 
future. Prime Minister Thapa argued that elections 
were the only acceptable means to restore the 
parliament but stressed that a minimum atmosphere 
of security would have to exist first.42 There is a 
Catch-22 aspect about this: it will be difficult to 
restore stability and security while the parties 
continue to feel alienated, but the government does 
not want to hold elections until calm is restored.  
Prime Minister Thapa has also emphasised restoring 
local government bodies. This preference for local 
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governance has some shades of the earlier panchayat, 
or partyless, era of royal rule before 1990 where 
democracy was largely tolerated only in name. UML 
party leader Madhav Kumar Nepal argued:  
The experiences of the last one year have 
shown that the country cannot move without 
the participation of the political parties. Parties 
should be given the right to choose the prime 
minister and ministers. In the 21st century, it is 
not in the interest of monarchy to get involved 
in controversy.43 
One Nepalese NGO complained about the diplomatic 
community, “They made the protestors work with the 
government; why doesn’t the international community 
tell the king he needs to return to a ceremonial 
role”?44 Yet, King Gyanendra has made quite clear 
that he sees his position as more than ceremonial. 
While he says an “active monarchy is not reasonable” 
in the 21st century, he has voiced his support for: 
…a constructive monarchy that, remaining 
within the constitution, performs its duty 
toward the people….The country should not 
have a situation where people from different 
professions, religions, shades of opinion and 
customs are driven to frustration, and because 
there is no one to redress their grievances, 
they are forced to rebel. 45  
The notion that the king would be in a meaningful 
position to address what he sees as the grievances of 
the people suggests that he envisions a reasonably 
active role for himself in the governance of the state. 
Equally clearly, the current situation – where the 
king is able to appoint and dismiss prime ministers 
at will – gives the monarch not only an active role, 
but an overarching one. While the diplomatic 
community in Kathmandu remains coy, there is also 
a sense of growing frustration toward the king.  
The palace, including some relatively hard-line 
advisors, still appears to prefer dealing with the 
Maoists first and address the role of the parties and 
democracy as a whole subsequently. Parties would 
only be brought in during a roundtable phase that 
would also bring together the Maoists, the 
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government, and a wide range of social groups. This 
would essentially freeze democratic actors out of the 
process until after a deal was signed – an approach 
that seems to be regarded almost universally as ill-
conceived. One diplomat commented that the refusal 
to accept a common candidate from the political 
parties “exposed the king’s charade for what it was: 
an effort to keep the foreign community quiet”.46  
It can be argued that there has been an over-emphasis 
on talks with the Maoists and an under-emphasis on 
sorting out the overall political situation. While 
restoring democracy is obviously not a panacea (the 
war started during democratic rule), it is difficult to 
imagine crafting a viable peace deal that would 
include major constitutional revisions without the 
democratic forces at the table. It is also true that the 
parties appear willing to work with the king to a 
certain degree, largely because they have no 
alternative. 
The king and prime minister have both expressed a 
willingness to form an all-party government under 
Prime Minister Thapa – the king’s hand-picked 
political leader. This seems to be a fundamental 
misreading of what an all-party government would 
represent. Efforts to pull the UML or another party 
into the government under Thapa have enjoyed 
limited success, and such a veneer of democracy 
would do little to stabilise the general situation. If a 
single major party was to break ranks and join the 
Thapa government, it would also likely make it a 
magnet for verbal and physical attacks. For example, 
if the UML were to join, it would likely be targeted 
by the Maoists while being derided by Congress and 
others as having sold out. Such fundamental 
calculations should not be lost on the palace. 
In many ways, the king has dwindling options. 
Moving from quick-fix to quick-fix to tamp down 
street protests is not sustainable. Repetition of the 
game of musical chairs that would accompany yet 
another switch in royalist prime ministers have 
limited utility. Disturbingly, murmurs are increasing 
in Kathmandu that the king is interested in sterner 
measures. One journalist noted, “If the government 
cannot control the situation, it will have several 
possible choices, and we hear rumours that an 
emergency will be declared soon”.47  
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As long as the parties and the palace refuse to work 
together constructively, and the palace treats the 
democratic process as little more than a sidebar, the 
Maoists will continue to exploit the tumult. 
V. HOW FAR APART?  
The breakdown in talks between the government 
and the Maoists and the generally poor handling of 
them have obscured the fact that the differences 
between government, Maoists and political parties 
are bridgeable.  
In April 2003, the Maoists presented a position 
paper to the government that included both broad 
and quite specific demands.48 The Maoists called for 
clarification on and release of prisoners of war, 
withdrawal of court cases against cadres, repeal of 
the Terrorist and Destructive Activities Act, return 
by the RNA to barracks and a committee to monitor 
the code of conduct. Consistent with their position 
during talks in 2001, they called for a roundtable 
conference including “democratic, patriotic and 
leftist forces which have a proved popular base”, an 
interim constitution and interim government by the 
roundtable conference, elections under the interim 
government to establish a constituent assembly with 
broad social representation, and the drafting of a 
new constitution by the constituent assembly. The 
Maoists also proposed merger of the RNA and their 
forces, a secular country, repeal of the 1950 India-
Nepal treaty and a number of other positions related 
to economic and social questions. 
Insistence on a constituent assembly has scant roots 
in traditional Marxist ideology. The Maoists have 
been adamantly reluctant to articulate the details of 
such an assembly. As one mediator observed, there 
needs to be a “detailed discussion on how to elect 
assembly members, draft a constitution and see that it 
is passed”.49 For an issue that has twice derailed talks, 
it is striking how little anyone seems to know about 
how a constituent assembly would actually work in 
practice. Certainly, security would be central to how 
any constituent assembly would be implemented, and 
the parties, the Maoists and the government all have 
apprehensions that the process could be manipulated 
by the others.  
 
 
 48 For the full text of these demands, see Depak Thapa , A 
Kingdom under Siege: Nepal’s Maoists Insurgency, 1996 to 
2003 ( Kathmandu, 2003).  
49 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 21 September 2003. 
An open-ended process poses existential threats to 
each actor: the parties fear they could be squeezed 
out as armed Maoists and armed government forces 
turn back the democratic rights secured in 1990; the 
king fears a republic could be established and end 
his reign; and the Maoists, who have not participated 
in elections since the early 1990s, fear they could be 
far less popular than they imagine.  
The Maoists’ negotiator, Baburam Bhattarai, argued: 
This round-table conference should work out 
an interim constitution, form an interim 
government and decide on all relevant issues 
necessary for a free and fair election to the 
constituent assembly, including the interim 
security mechanism. And finally, the interim 
government should hold a free and fair 
election to the constituent assembly within a 
stipulated time, preferably six months.…Of 
course, different political forces would be free 
to put forward their separate agenda on varied 
questions like the fate of the monarchy, but 
should abide by the decision of the constituent 
assembly. This was, in brief, our minimum 
political agenda proposed at the recent peace 
negotiations, which was rejected by the 
royalist regime leading to the ultimate 
breakdown of negotiations and ceasefire.50 
A number of foreign diplomats publicly praised the 
position paper the government presented at the third 
round in August 2003 as a response to the paper 
forwarded by the Maoists in April. This was quickly 
viewed by the Maoists as further evidence that the 
international community was in bed with the 
monarchy. A Nepalese NGO official also argued 
that international support for the position paper “was 
not appropriate at that time” and created the 
impression among the Maoists and the others that it 
had been jointly prepared by the king and foreign 
governments.51 
That said, the paper was progressive in many 
regards, although it side stepped several major 
issues. It largely glossed over the current messy 
state of affairs and resisted any suggestion that the 
government was in power by unconstitutional 
means. Instead, the paper maintained: 
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In spite of certain inconsistencies and obstacles 
in the implementation of some constitutional 
provisions, the constitution is alive and 
functional to date as an excellent document in 
view of the democratic values and norms.52  
The government’s position included a number of 
major accommodations, largely on the social front, 
and called for the constitutional monarchy and multi-
party democracy to be the bedrock of governance. 
Prospective reforms included: establishing neutral 
governments three months before general elections; 
proportional representation; restructuring of the 
upper house to include more groups that have 
traditionally suffered discrimination; reserving 25 per 
cent of all seats in representative institutions for 
women; special provisions for reserving positions for 
discriminated groups in education, health and 
employment; broader use of local languages in local 
government; and referendums for issues of national 
importance. 
The roadmap for the peace process detailed by the 
royalist government went as follows: negotiations 
with the Maoists to reach consensus on “objectives, 
contents and process” for reforms; a roundtable 
conference including the political parties designed to 
produce a national consensus; formation of an 
interim electoral government including the Maoists; 
parliamentary elections; and, lastly, constitutional 
amendment. Several issues were notable by their 
absence. The government offered a roundtable 
conference, but no constituent assembly. Control of 
the RNA – an issue of increasing importance to both 
the parties and the Maoists the longer the conflict 
has ground on – was pushed to the side, as was any 
suggestion that the monarchy’s powers might be 
diminished. The paper also stressed that “the issue of 
handing over of the arms and ammunitions lying 
with the Maoists side should be one of the important 
items of the agenda of the negotiations”. 
Both sides continue to focus most closely on the 
power issues, and despite the lofty rhetoric they use 
with regard to minority groups and social issues, 
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control of the government is the main point of 
contention. One NGO official observed that the 
Maoists “are not fighting for minority rights, they 
are fighting for power”.53 A Western diplomat 
maintained, “The Maoists did not have any great 
quarrel with what was in the paper, it was some 
things that are not”.54 
The issue then becomes the best arrangement that 
would allow both Maoists and royalist government 
to save a measure of face while ensuring that the 
peace process actually does broadly respect the 
rights of Nepalese and restore the democratic 
process. Ensuring that the parties are represented at 
the talks is essential. The Maoists have given 
repeated signals that they would be willing to accept 
the continued existence of the monarchy, as long as 
the king was relegated to a far more ceremonial role. 
However, a Nepalese political scientist argued that 
while the Maoists may be more conciliatory than 
their public tone would suggest, “there would be a 
major split in the party” if they accepted something 
short of a constituent assembly.55  
The government has also shown some flexibility. 
“When you listen to the government team, it all 
sounds quite reasonable. They are willing to discuss 
any subject, even the monarchy”, said a party close 
to the talks.56 The royalist government appears to be 
willing to deal with the status of the monarchy and 
the RNA as long as this is within the more controlled 
confines of a constitutional amendment. 
It would clearly be useful if the parties, royalist 
government and the Maoists could reach 
understandings about the ultimate contours of a 
peace agreement and basic constitutional principles 
while agreeing also on some process that gave the 
Maoists rhetorical cover with their cadres to claim 
that a constituent assembly had been secured. 
Baburam Bhattarai rather cleverly leaves the door 
open to such an approach even though insisting that 
a full constituent assembly is the only way forward:  
…any idea of “partial sovereignty” to the 
people is fraught with immense loopholes and 
danger to democracy. Attaching any 
“precondition” to [a] constituent assembly 
does precisely that. Our Party is, therefore, 
 
53 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 17 September 2003. 
54 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 17 September 2003. 
55 ICG interview, Kathmandu, 22 September 2003. 
56 ICG interview, Kathmandu, September 2003. 
Nepal: Back to the Gun 
ICG Asia Briefing Paper, 22 October 2003 Page 13 
 
 
opposed to the idea of attaching any 
precondition to the constituent assembly. Of 
course, different political parties and the king, 
for that matter, can go to the people with their 
own agenda during the election. Also, if the 
particular historical condition and the 
prevailing balance of forces so demand, there 
can be common understanding on certain 
issues during and after the election, but not 
certainly in the very beginning or right now 
and on fundamental questions of democracy.57 
There has also been some discussion that a 
constitutional commission could be formed as in 
1990, drawing elements from the palace, the parties 
and the Maoists. Neither the parties nor the royalist 
government should accede to a constituent assembly 
until it has been far better defined, the parties have 
been brought to the negotiating table and there have 
been extensive discussions about security 
arrangements that would accompany any ballot and 
demobilisation agreement.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
There is every indication that the violence could 
continue at least for months. With both the Maoists 
and the royalist government seemingly bent on 
another period of muscle-flexing, innocent civilians 
will again pay the heaviest toll. As one journalist 
lamented, “Whole villages are getting up and 
leaving”.58 Both the army and the Maoists appear to 
feel confident, having made their preparations, that 
they stand to gain from continued intimidation. Both 
sides may consider that a quick return to negotiations 
would diminish their stature: the Maoists because 
they had just rejected a government proposal and the 
government because it had just made a proposal that 
was rejected. 
Grim storm clouds line Nepal’s horizon. There has 
been increasing talk of the king taking a more active 
and central role in the affairs of state for an extended 
period of time, and the palace has manoeuvred itself 
into a position where authoritarian solutions may be 
ever more likely. A journalist maintained, “The 
monarchy is surviving on the credibility of the 
RNA”. In many respects, the longer the palace 
continues to be the focus of all questions not only of 
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war and peace but also of governance, the more 
jeopardy the monarchy may find itself in.59 
The international community, while showing some 
signs toward unity, remains divided on how much 
leeway to give the royalist government and whether 
force or diplomacy ultimately is the best tool for 
dealing with the Maoists. The more activist approach 
has again raised fears among local commentators 
and the Maoists about foreign intervention in 
Nepalese domestic affairs. These fears aside, a more 
coordinated approach would be welcome, and it is 
useful that all of the major international players in 
Nepal have gone strongly on the record in support of 
a rapid return to democracy. However, the 
international community must also take great care to 
fashion its intervention so as to support lasting peace 
and stability.  
It remains an open question how long the Nepali 
Congress and UML will remain accommodating if 
there is no progress toward restoration of the 
democratic process from the palace. Pressure will 
also likely mount from smaller parties to intensify 
agitation to restore democracy, and widespread 
protest activity could further fuel the environment 
of chaos.  
Now would seem to be the time for the international 
community to lean heavily on all the actors to 
behave responsibly. The Maoists should be warned 
that they are in ever growing danger of being seen as 
a force that is unwilling to embrace compromise and 
consequently of being increasingly condemned and 
opposed. The royalist government should be warned 
that the time for hollow rhetoric about democracy 
has passed and that an all-party government should 
be formed and the RNA held accountable for abuses 
in the field. Lastly, the parties should be warned that 
they can only expect to have a responsible role in the 
life and death matters of civil war, when in the 
national interest they put aside their own in-fighting 
and venality. 
Kathmandu/Brussels 22 October 2002 
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